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Financial analysts’ forecasts of corporate earnings are an important input to investors’ decision models, 
e.g. valuation models. Yet there is extensive evidence suggesting that analysts’ forecasts are “irrational” – 
specifically they appear to be biased (ex post forecast errors have a non-zero mean) and inefficient (ex 
post forecast errors are correlated with information known at the forecast date).
1 Recent work has 
proposed two explanations for such findings based on the idea that the statistical bias and inefficiency of 
forecasts is rational and originates in the loss functions underpinning analysts’ forecast decisions, i.e. how 
analysts weight prospective prediction errors when deciding on “optimal” earnings forecasts. For example, 
Gu and Wu (2003) and Basu and Markov (2004) suggest that analysts have linear loss functions. A 
mutually exclusive alternative explanation is that analysts have asymmetric loss functions, perhaps 
motivated by private incentives originating in business relationships between securities firms and their 
investment banking clients, or in analysts’ dependence on managers for information (e.g. Lin and 
McNichols, 1998; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lim, 2001; Hong and Kubik, 2003).
2 Prior research reports 
evidence consistent with both explanations, but does not test the linear loss explanation against the 
asymmetric loss alternative. Better understanding of the nature of analysts’ loss functions is potentially 
important for investors. Although it is investors’ loss functions which ultimately determine investment 
decisions, interpretation and use of analysts’ forecasts by investors should reflect beliefs concerning 
analysts’ loss functions (Lambert, 2004, p.221). This paper contains new evidence suggesting analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are driven by asymmetric loss functions. 
                                                           
1 See Kothari (2001) for a review. 
2 Other explanations forecast bias and inefficiency proposed in the literature suggest either that analysts are irrational 
and display cognitive biases (e.g. Friesen and Weller, 2002), or that there are incentives for them to report forecasts 
untruthfully or selectively (e.g. McNichols and O’Brien, 1998). 
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  Understanding the nature of analysts’ loss functions is relevant to interpreting and using forecasts 
because a rational analyst’s “optimal” earnings forecast depends on both the subjective probability 
distribution of earnings and on the analyst’s loss function. A rational analyst with a quadratic loss function 
minimizes the mean squared value of anticipated forecast errors (MSE), and in this case the optimal 
forecast is the conditional mean of earnings and the expected value of the mean forecast error is zero; 
however, the median forecast error depends on the distribution of earnings. In contrast, a rational analyst 
with a symmetric linear loss function minimizes the mean absolute value of anticipated forecast errors 
(MAE), the optimal forecast is the conditional median and the expected value of the median forecast error 
is zero, while the mean value depends on the distribution of earnings. Similar to a quadratic loss function, 
a linear loss function is symmetric in weighting positive and negative forecast errors of the same 
magnitude, but it gives less weight to extreme forecast errors.
3 In the case of asymmetric loss functions, 
optimal forecasts are not consistent with the MSE or MAE criteria and both mean and median forecast 
errors can have expected values different from zero (Keane and Runkle, 1998). The properties of forecast 
errors under asymmetric loss depend on both the distribution of earnings and on the functional form and 
parameters of the loss function.  
  We test whether analysts produce forecasts consistent with asymmetric loss functions against the 
alternative of symmetric loss (either quadratic or linear). Our analysis is based on theoretical predictions 
relating forecast errors to the variance and skewness of the forecast error distribution. Our approach builds 
on Gu and Wu (2003), who conjecture that, due to analysts facing linear loss functions, the magnitude of 
forecast errors depends on ex ante skewness of the earnings (and hence of forecast error) distribution, 
though not on the variance. Consistent with this prediction, Gu and Wu (2003) report evidence that 
forecast errors are positively associated with the skewness of earnings, although they do not control for 
variance. Our analysis of asymmetric loss assumes that analysts’ loss functions belong to the Linex class 
of asymmetric loss functions introduced by Varian (1974) and Zellner (1986). Under Linex loss functions, 
                                                           
3 Granger (1969) proposes a piecewise linear (LIN-LIN) loss function that weights positive and negative forecast 
errors of similar magnitude differently.  
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forecast errors are predicted to depend on the variance of the forecast error. If the distribution of forecast 
errors is conditionally non-normal, forecast errors under Linex loss functions also depend on higher 
moments, including skewness. The linear (MAE) loss function is a special limiting case in which forecast 
errors depend only on skewness. Dependence of forecast errors on the forecast error variance under Linex-
class asymmetric loss functions but not under linear loss functions suggests a way of discriminating 
between symmetric linear and asymmetric loss functions.  
  We test whether the ex ante variance of the forecast error is incrementally significant in a 
regression that includes both variance and skewness instruments. Our results confirm that the ex ante 
forecast error variance instrument is a significant determinant of the forecast error. This is consistent with 
financial analysts having asymmetric loss functions. Further analysis reveals that the dominant role of 
forecast error variance in explaining forecast bias is robust across portfolios formed on the basis of book-
to-price ratio and market capitalization. These firm characteristics are known determinants of forecast 
error accuracy and skewness.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the theory of the Linex loss 
function and derive empirical predictions that distinguish between linear and asymmetric loss. In section 3 
we describe our empirical research design. In section 4 we describe our dataset and report our empirical 
results. Section 5 contains our conclusions.  
   
2.    Loss functions and forecast bias 
  Two elements of the forecasting process determine whether a rational earnings forecast is biased. 
The analyst’s loss function and the subjective probability distribution associated with the variable being 
forecasted combine to generate an optimal forecast. If the subjective probability distribution of earnings is 
skewed, rational forecasts produced by analysts with symmetric loss functions will be biased, unless the 
loss function is quadratic (Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu and Markov, 2004). However, earnings skewness is not 
necessary for optimal forecasts to be biased because of the role played by the loss function. Although 
Christofferson and Diebold (1997) show that closed form solutions for the optimal forecast cannot be 
  3   
developed for general asymmetric loss functions, the properties of optimal forecasts have been analyzed 
for two specific asymmetric loss functions: Lin-Lin and Linex. 
  Granger (1969) demonstrates that even if the data generating process for a variable follows an 
unconditional Gaussian process, optimal forecasts will exhibit constant bias when the forecaster optimizes 
with reference to an asymmetric, piecewise-linear, Lin-Lin loss function. In this case the constant 
marginal loss (or cost) associated a unit forecast error above some threshold (e.g. zero) is different from 
the constant marginal loss for a unit forecast error below the threshold. The magnitude of the optimal bias 
depends on the parameters of the loss function, and on the forecast error variance. Christofferson and 
Diebold (1996, 1997) extend Granger’s analysis to conditional Gaussian processes. In this case, optimal 
forecasts exhibit time-varying bias, conditional on the time-varying forecast error variance.  
  The Linex loss function is a more general asymmetric loss function specification than Lin-Lin 
(Varian, 1974; Zellner, 1986). Assume that the variable to be forecast is earnings at time t, denoted yt.  The 
Linex loss function has the form:  
     2
(1 )







=                (1) 
whereα  is a constant and xt is the forecast error at time t, defined as  - tt t x yf ≡ , where  t f  is the forecast. 
The parameter α  determines the degree of asymmetry. A Linex function withα  = 0.7 is plotted in Figure 
1. A convenient property of the Linex loss function is that it nests the quadratic loss function as 0 α → .
4  
  Under the Linex loss function, optimistic forecasts (negative forecast errors) are more costly than 
pessimistic forecasts (positive forecast errors) when α < 0. In this case, the loss is approximately 
exponential in x if x < 0, and approximately linear in x if x > 0. Conversely, if α  > 0, the Linex function 
is exponential to the right of the origin, and linear to the left. In this case, pessimistic forecasts (positive 
forecast errors) are more costly than optimistic forecasts (negative forecast errors).   
                                                           
4 As α → 0, the numerator and the denominator of (1) tend to zero. Consequently, as α → 0, we employ L’Hospital’s 
rule to obtain the quadratic form.  
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  Assume initially earnings, yt, are generated by a conditional Gaussian process. Diebold and 
Christofferson (1996, 1997) show that under the Linex loss function (1), the optimal h-period ahead 
forecast, ft,t+h, is given by: 




2                                                           (2) 
where  ( tt h E ) µ +  is the expectation of the mean of yt+h conditional on information at time t (and is the 
optimal forecast under quadratic loss) and  is the expectation of the conditional error variance 
over the h periods. Expression (2) tells us that the optimal forecast for a rational analyst with an 
asymmetric loss function, given by the Linex function (1), differs from the conditional mean, i.e. the 
forecast is biased. It is optimal for the analyst to produce optimistic forecasts if 
Ett h ( σ +
2 )
α  > 0. Diebold and 
Christofferson (1996, 1997) also show that the ex post forecast error, t x , is given by:  
2 ()
2
tt t h t x Ez
α
σ + = −+                                                         (3) 
where  is a zero mean moving average error process of order h- 1.  zt
Expressions (2) and (3) indicate that the optimal bias for an asymmetric loss analyst depends 
positively on the loss function parameter,α , and on the variance of the forecast error. Thus, given that the 
forecast error variance, , is positive, if forecast errors are on average negative (forecasts are on 
average optimistic), this is consistent with a positive loss function parameter,
Ett h ( σ +
2 )
α .  
  The optimal forecast expression (2) assumes that the outcome (earnings) series, yt,, is a conditional 
Gaussian process. If we relax this assumption, it is possible to show that the optimal forecast and the 
forecast error depend on both the variance and the skewness of the forecast error process. The forecast 
error is given by: 
23 [( ) ,( ) ] t tt t h t t h vG E E z σσ ++
* = +                                                      (4) 
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where   is a moving average error process,   is the expectation of conditional skewness in the 
forecast error and G is a nonlinear, positive function of both the conditional variance and the conditional 
skewness of the forecast error process (see Appendix A for the proof). 
*
t z Ett h ( σ +
3 )
  Expressions (3) and (4) have important empirical implications, given that the distributions of 
earnings and earnings forecast errors are non-normal (e.g. Gu and Wu, 2003; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 
2003). Under asymmetric loss, if α > 0 then forecast bias is expected to depend on the positively on the 
variance of the forecast error. The theory also predicts that forecast errors will be positively related to 
skewness, although the association will be weak if the magnitude of α is small. In contrast, if the loss 
function is linear and symmetric (MAE), as assumed by Gu and Wu (2003), forecast bias depends only on 
the skewness of earnings (or forecast errors). This suggests that a simple test of whether analysts’ loss 
functions are asymmetric is to examine dependence between forecast errors and the proxies for the 
conditional variance and conditional skewness of forecast errors. If only skewness is significant then this 
is consistent with analysts minimising absolute forecast errors. If variance of forecast error is a significant 
determinant of forecast errors then the hypothesis that analysts minimize absolute forecast error can be 
rejected in favour of an asymmetric loss function, under the maintained assumption of rational 
expectations. 
 
3.   Research design 
We assume that analysts’ loss functions take account of any scale-related component of forecast errors. 
Since analysts forecast earnings per share, the magnitude of raw forecast errors will depend on the “scale” 
of the stock. Holding the size of firms constant, a firm with N issued shares will have earnings per share 
forecast errors that are twice as large as an otherwise identical firm with 2N issued shares. If we assume 
that costs associated with forecast errors are related to the proportionate valuation errors that could arise 
from use of forecasts, this suggests that the argument of the loss functions will be price-scaled forecast 
  6   
error.
5 However, while our main tests employ price-scaled forecast errors, in unreported sensitivity checks 
we also estimated regressions using un-scaled data. In this case, we scale ERROR and the prior periods’ 
earnings change variables (SUE1 and SUE2) by stock price at t-1. Our tests are based on the empirical 
model in Gu and Wu (2003).
6 We extend their model by adding a proxy for the conditional variance and 
skewness of forecast errors. The main estimating equation is as follows: 
it it it it it
it it it it
SUE b SUE b LOSS b ANFLL b
MVAL b ERRSKEW ERRVAR b ERROR
ε
λ λ
+ + + + +
+ + + =
2 1 ln
ln
5 4 3 2
1 2 1 0                               (5) 
In line with Gu and Wu (2003), ERROR is defined as actual quarterly earnings taken from I/B/E/S minus 
the median of all forecasts of quarterly earnings issued within 90 days of the earnings announcement, 
scaled by beginning-of-period stock price. ERRVAR is defined as the second moment of the previous 8 
quarters’ scaled forecast errors for firm i, while ERRSKEW is the third moment of the previous 8 quarters’ 
scaled forecast errors for firm i.  lnMVAL is the natural logarithm of market value at the beginning of 
quarter t and is included to control for the possibility that analysts issue more biased forecasts for smaller 
companies in order to obtain access to management where less information is available (Francis and 
Willis, 2001).  lnANFLL is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing forecasts for firm i in quarter t 
(Gu and Wu, 2003).  We also include LOSS as an indicator variable (equal to 1 if the consensus forecast of 
earnings is negative, zero otherwise) because it has been argued that forecasts of losses are more 
optimistic (e.g. Duru and Reeb, 2002).  SUE1 and SUE2 are included to control for analyst underreaction 
(e.g. Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992) and are defined as, respectively, the one period and two period lagged 
earnings surprise based on a seasonal random walk model. 
 
                                                           
5 For example, suppose that intrinsic value is estimated using the P/E multiple approach and is a multiple of forecast 
earnings per share. Then the per share intrinsic value estimation error is proportional to the scaled forecast error. 
6 Although Gu and Wu’s (2003) model forms the basis for our tests, there are differences between our model and 
theirs.  For instance, they include measures of earnings variability and forecast variability as control variables in their 
test of the MAE loss function, whereas we include the variance of the forecast error as a central test of an 
asymmetric loss function. We note that theoretically it is the moments of forecast errors that are relevant 
determinants of any bias, and not the distribution of the variable to be forecast. Moreover, because we arrive at our 
predictions from a different theoretical standpoint to Gu and Wu, their estimates of skewness are based on a period 
before and after quarter t, whereas our tests are based only on ex ante estimates. 
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4. Empirical  tests 
4.1  Data 
Our sample is drawn from the I/B/E/S detail history files for the period 1983 to 2003.  To ensure 
consistency, we retrieve individual quarterly forecasts, actual earnings, earnings announcement dates and 
stock price data all from I/B/E/S.  We require each firm to have at least eight consecutive quarters’ actual 
earnings and forecast data in order to generate our measures of forecast error variance and skewness.  We 
define the consensus forecast as the median of all forecasts issued within 90 days of the earnings 
announcement date.  Forecast error (ERROR) is defined as actual earnings at time t, minus the consensus 
forecast, divided by stock price at the beginning of the forecast period, multiplied by 100.  Negative errors 
therefore imply analyst optimism.   
We measure error variance as the unstandardised variance of ERROR in the preceding eight 
periods, i.e., the sum of the squared deviations from the mean of ERROR over the previous eight quarters.  
Our measure of skewness is defined as the sum of the cubed deviations from the mean ERROR for the 
eight quarters prior to quarter t. In order to remove potential data errors, we winsorize the error and 
earnings related variables at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles, in line with previous research (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy, 2003).  Our results are robust to alternative outlier deletion procedures (e.g. removing 
observations in the 5
th and 95
th percentiles).   
 
4.2   Descriptive statistics 
Our final sample comprises 79,653 firm quarters for 4,335 firms.  Table 1, panel A, provides summary 
statistics. In line with prior research (e.g. Basu and Markov 2004), the sample-wide distribution of forecast 
error is negatively skewed, with the mean forecast error being negative (consistent with on-average 
optimism bias) and the median forecast error being slightly positive. Our measures of firm-specific ex ante 
error variance (ERRVAR) and skewness (ERRSKEW) both display a high degree of variability.  The 
statistics for LOSS and FLLW show that approximately 10% of the firms in our sample were forecast to 
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make a loss and the median number of analysts following each firm in quarter t is 6.  Panel B provides 
reassurance that the forecast error distribution in our sample is consistent with the prior literature by 
comparing our sample with that in Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003). The comparison shows that the two 
samples are very similar, despite the forecast data being from different data sources.  
  Panel C of table 1 reports the correlations between variables. Particularly noteworthy is the high 
negative correlation between ERRVAR and ERRSKEW. This suggests the possibility that skewness could 
be serving a proxy role for variance in Gu and Wu (2003). Since dependence of the forecast error on 
variance is key empirical prediction that distinguishes the symmetric (linear) loss explanation of forecast 
bias from the asymmetric loss explanation, this characteristic of the data points to the importance of 
controlling for variance in evaluating these two competing explanations.  
4.3 Regression  results 
Our main regression results are reported in Table 2. We estimate six versions of equation (5) including 
one or both of ERRVAR and ERRSKEW and both with and without control variables. In view of the clear 
non-normality in the distribution of forecast errors in table 1, the possibility exists that inferences are 
sensitive to heteroskedasticity and non-normality in regression errors. Therefore we report both OLS t –
statistics (as in Gu and Wu, 2003) and t –statistics based on White robust standard errors.
7  Table 2 
indicates that the White corrected t-statistics are often very much lower than the OLS t-statistics, and 
inferences regarding the significance of ERRSKEW are sensitive to the choice of test statistic. Breusch-
Pagan (1979) tests rejected the null of constant variance in all reported models.  We therefore rely on the 
more conservative White corrected t-statistics, where relevant. 
                                                           
7 We also examined the sensitivity of inferences to use of exact critical values for the White standard errors obtained 
from the Wild bootstrap methodology. Although critical values obtained from the bootstrap methodology are much 
higher than classical values, indicating that non-normality is a significant problem, the main inferences are 
unchanged. Indeed, they are reinforced. 
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  The results in table 2 generally confirm prior research. Models 3 and 6 reveal a significant positive 
association between ERROR and ERRSKEW when ERRVAR is excluded.
8 This is consistent with Gu and 
Wu (2003). Results for models 1 and 4 indicate that if ERRSKEW is replaced by ERRVAR, model 
specification improves (adjusted R
2 increases from 1.76% (5.48%) without (with) control variables to 
2.73% (6.12%)). The sign of the coefficients on ERRVAR are negative, as predicted if positive forecast 
errors are more costly to analysts than negative forecast errors, i.e. if α > 0. Results for models 2 and 5 
indicate that the statistical significance of ERRVAR remains, even after controlling for ERRSKEW, and 
despite the high correlation between ERRVAR and ERRSKEW that would be expected to bias t-statistics 
towards zero.
9  Note, however, that when ERRVAR is included in the model, the sign of the coefficient on 
ERRSKEW in models 2 and 5 is negative, as predicted by the asymmetric loss function explanation of 
forecast bias, and in contrast to the positive coefficients in models 3 and 6. Further, based on White 
corrected t-statistics, the significance of ERRSKEW is at best marginal, whereas using OLS t-statistics 
ERRSKEW appears highly significant.  
  Generally the results in table 2 indicate that results are not sensitive to inclusion of control 
variables. Inferences regarding the significance of ERRVAR and ERRSKEW are identical for model 1-3 
and for models 4-6. Therefore, in subsequent tests we focus on models 1-3. The estimated parameters for 
the control variables in models 4-6 are generally in line with the findings in prior research. Forecast errors 
are positively related to firm size (as captured by lnMVAL) in each of the reported models, suggesting that 
analysts are more optimistic when forecasting earnings of smaller firms. We further examine this issue 
below. There are significant negative coefficients on the analyst following variable (lnANFLL) and the 
loss variable (FCLOSS), both of which are consistent with Gu and Wu (2003).  Like many previous 
studies (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999), there is also evidence of 
                                                           
8 Gu and Wu (2003) employ measures of variance and skewness based on the distribution of earnings. We use 
measures based on the distribution of forecast errors, to be consistent with theory. However, empirically, measures 
under the two approaches are highly correlated. If we replace our measures with measures similar to Gu and Wu 
(2003) we obtain qualitatively similar results to those reported here. Details are available from the authors. 
9 Despite the high univariate correlation between ERRVAR and ERRSKEW, all variance inflation factors in the 
multivariate analyses were well under the commonly used threshold of 10 (e.g., Chatterjee and Price, 1977). 
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underreaction to prior period earnings changes – coefficients on both SUE1 and SUE2 are significant and 
positive in each of models 4-6.  
Overall, we interpret the results in table 2 as providing strong support for the conjecture that 
analyst forecast bias is associated with analysts having asymmetric loss functions, rather than linear 
symmetric loss functions. If analysts’ loss functions are linear and symmetric, forecast errors should be a 
function of ERRSKEW but not ERRVAR, whereas asymmetric loss should result in the statistical 
significance of ERRVAR, with ERRSKEW having the same sign as ERRVAR. This is exactly what we find 
in our results.  
4.4  Book-to-market and size portfolio analysis 
The results reported in table 2 are based on a very large sample and unreported analysis reveals they are 
extremely robust to various model specification and variable measurement choices (see section 4.5 
below). In this section we show that the findings reported  above extend to portfolios sorted on a priori 
determinants of analyst forecast bias that are also correlates of forecast error variance and skewness. We 
consider the relation between forecast errors and ERRVAR and ERSKEW for portfolios sorted on the basis 
of book-to-market ratio and on market capitalization. If ERRVAR retains it ability to explain within-
portfolio forecast errors, this constitutes an even more powerful test of the asymmetric loss function 
explanation.  
  We sort portfolios on the basis of these stock characteristics first because they are the basis of 
commonly used investment styles - book-to-market ratio is a common characteristic for distinguishing 
between value and glamour stocks. Doukas et al. (2002) show that analyst forecast bias differs 
significantly across portfolios sorted on these characteristics, although not in a direction capable of 
explaining the value premium the irrational extrapolation hypothesis. Second, recent research suggests 
that book-to-market is a useful instrument that captures the degree of accounting conservatism (Beaver 
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and Ryan, 2005) and, that conservatism is an important determinant of the distributional properties of 
earnings and forecast errors (see, e.g., Basu, 1997; Helbok and Walker, 2004).  
  We form one-way sorted portfolios each quarter based on beginning-of-quarter book-to-price and 
on market capitalization. Table 3 confirms that forecast errors are indeed dramatically different across 
book-to-market ratio and market capitalization portfolios.  The mean values of ERROR lie between            
-0.01% for low book-to-market stocks to -0.28% for high book-to-market stocks, indicating that the 
optimistic bias is much higher for high book-to-market stocks. Note also that the standard deviation of 
ERROR increases and the negative skewness decreases monotonically across book-to-market portfolios. In 
contrast the stock level estimates of ERRVAR and ERRSKEW indicate that forecast error variance 
increases dramatically with book-to-market and forecast error skewness is negative and decreases 
dramatically with book-to-market. Similar patterns are observed across size-sorted portfolios. The degree 
of optimistic bias in forecasts is much higher for small firms, and ERRVAR decreases dramatically as 
firms become larger, as does the extent to which ERRSKEW is negative. The patterns of ERRVAR and 
ERRSKEW across characteristic portfolios are consistent with the observed forecast error bias. 
  In Table 4 we estimate models 1-3 similar to table 2, but for the one-way sorted portfolios. Results 
are generally consistent with table 2.
10 Panel A reports results for portfolios sorted on book-to-market. The 
coefficient on ERRVAR when it is the sole independent variable is consistently negative, as predicted by 
the asymmetric loss function explanation, and significant at the 10% level or better. Similarly, the 
coefficient on ERRVAR in model 3 is positive and significant in three out of four cases. When both 
ERRVAR and ERRSKEW are included in the same regression (model 2), multi-collinearity problems 
become somewhat more severe but ERRVAR retains its significance for high book-to-market portfolios 
where forecast bias is greatest. The sign on ERRSKEW changes from positive to negative in three out of 
four cases, although it is significant in only one case.  
                                                           
10  Additional (unreported) tests showed that the results in table 4 are not sensitive to the inclusion of the control 
variables. 
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  Results in table 4 panel B for size-sorted portfolios are similar. ERRVAR is negative and 
significant for all portfolios in model 1, while ERRSKEW is positive and significant. When ERRVAR and 
ERRSKEW are entered jointly, only ERRVAR is significant (in three cases at better than the 10% level) . 
ERRSKEW is insignificant in all cases. Again, multi-collinearity does present a problem for some 
portfolios, especially in the case of the larger firm portfolios, and this explains why ERRVAR loses 
significance when ERRSKEW is added. 
  Overall, the results in table 4 confirm that the variance of forecast errors is a significant 
determinant of forecast bias, even after first sorting firms into portfolios based on stock characteristics that 
sharply discriminate between different levels of forecast bias and forecast error variance and skewness. 
The continued significance of ERRVAR as an explanatory factor for forecast errors supports the earlier 
evidence in favour of the conjecture that financial analysts form their forecasts with reference to 
asymmetric loss functions.  
4.5 Robustness  checks 
  The results we have reported are based on price-scaled forecast errors. We believe that there are 
good reasons for scaling, based on considering the links between forecast errors and the costs borne by 
users of earnings forecasts (see e.g. footnote 5). However, there is accumulating evidence that scaling may 
have perverse effects on the distributional properties of variables (see, e.g., Cohen and Lys, 2003; 
Durtschi and Easton, 2004; Lambert, 2004). For this reason, we also employed the Wild bootstrap 
methodology to both price-scaled and un-scaled data and identified critical values for relevant test 
statistics (e.g. Davidson and Flachaire, 2001). This methodology utilizes the distribution of the error term 
in the main estimating equation to simulate empirical confidence intervals necessary to reject the null 
hypothesis when the null holds. It provides a powerful test of statistical significance when the underlying 
regression error distribution is non-normal (Wu, 1986; Hardle and Mammen, 1993). Use of the Wild 
bootstrap can result in critical values differing dramatically from classical values. For example, according 
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to our estimates, critical values to allow rejection of the hypothesis that skewness is significantly different 
from zero are up to 74% higher than the classical value (for p< 0.05) for un-scaled data. Despite this, in 
unreported results we find that all the inferences drawn from the main results reported in table 2 remain 
intact, after taking account of the bootstrapped critical values. 
  As a further robustness check, we also estimated Models 1–6 using least absolute deviation (LAD) 
regression, as used by Basu and Markov (2004) and Fama MacBeth (1973) regressions. The results (not 
reported) are again consistent with those reported in Tables 2 and 4.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
Previous research has consistently found evidence of bias and inefficiency in financial analysts’ forecasts 
of earnings.  Recent research by Gu and Wu (2003) and Basu and Markov (2004) has examined the 
possibility that these findings are attributable to an unrealistic assumption of a quadratic loss function, and 
has concluded that analysts’ objective is to minimise the mean absolute forecast error (MAE), rather than 
mean squared error.  The mean absolute error loss function penalises forecast optimism and pessimism 
equally.  The explanation for forecast bias is attributable to skewness in the distribution of earnings. 
However, numerous studies suggest that analysts’ motives may be driven by the costs associated with 
under-predicting earnings being higher than the costs of over-predicting earnings, i.e. asymmetric loss 
functions.  Asymmetric loss functions could result from incentives to gain access to management and/or 
more favourable career prospects for analysts who are systematically optimistic (e.g., Lim, 2001; Hong 
and Kubik, 2003).  In this paper, we test whether analysts’ forecasts are consistent with loss functions 
being asymmetric. 
  Under the MAE loss function, forecast error is a function only of forecast error skewness. In 
contrast, under the asymmetric Linex loss function, ex post error is also a function of error variance.  Our 
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results indicate that the linear symmetric loss function of MAE can be rejected in favour of the Linex 
function. We find that forecast error is more strongly related to prior forecast error variance than to 
skewness.  Indeed, when forecast error variance is included in forecast error regressions, the sign on 
forecast error skewness changes. These results strongly suggest that analysts have asymmetric loss 
functions. 
  Our results have important implications for the interpretation of analysts’ forecasts. The 
assumption that analysts’ objective is solely to minimise forecast error may be inappropriate.  As pointed 
out by Lambert (2004), it is investors’, rather than analysts’, loss functions that are ultimately most 
important in determining security prices.  However, to the extent that analysts’ forecasts influence 
investors’ decision making, an understanding of the shape of analysts’ loss function is necessary to enable 
investors to consider adjustment for potential biases. 
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Rearranging (A4) we obtain equation (4) in text. 
Note that if we approximate (A1) to order 3 we obtain 





σ ++0 = ZZ . 
Therefore 





σ += − . 
If α > 0 then Z becomes more negative - and hence optimism bias increases - as the forecast error variance 
increases. In other words, the degree of optimism is a positive function of the forecast error variance. This 
is consistent with the closed form result of Diebold and Christofferson (1996, 1997) in expression (3).  
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Expression (A4) can be rewritten as follows: 
   
22
22 3 2 3 0
22 6 2 6
ZZ Z Z εε
αα α α α
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2
ε σ =      ( A 5 )  
If the sum of the last two terms in (A5) is positive, then the equation has two complex roots and one real 
root. By inspection, ceteris paribus, irrespective of the sign of α, Z is a negative function of 
3
ε σ (and 
optimism bias is a positive function of 
3
ε σ ). In other words, the signs on the coefficients on both forecast 
error variance and forecast error skewness should be negative for α > 0. Note that if forecast error 
skewness is negative, skewness will partially offset the optimism bias induced by forecast error variance. 
However, generally, the marginal impact of skewness will be dominated by the variance effect when |α| < 
1.   
  Note that while the above analysis has been conducted in the context of the Linex loss function, it 
is applicable, any continuous loss function to order four will generate a quartic expression analogous to 
expression (A1) and hence forecast error variance and skewness will be determinants of bias, in contrast to 
symmetric loss functions where variance plays no role. 
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Fig. 1: Linex loss function for α = 0.7 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (n=79,653) 
Variable    Mean Median Std. dev.  Skewness
ERROR   -0.1074 0.0125 1.10  -4.77
ERRVAR   10.0099 0.4005 44.0940  6.52
ERRSKEW   -46.4005 -0.0001 321.6870  -7.88
MVAL (mil $)    4,815 1046 17268  12.17
ANFLL   8.7291 6.0000 8.13  2.39
LOSS   0.1054 0.0000 0.31  2.57
SUE1   -0.0412 0.1521 1.93  -1.06
SUE2   -0.0319 0.1542 1.85  -1.13
Panel B: Comparison of Forecast Error (ERROR) Distribution with Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) Sample 
 Our  sample 
(N = 79,653) 
 Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) 
(N = 33,548) 
Mean -0.107  -0.126 
Median 0.012  0.000 
% positive  51%  48% 
% negative  37%  40% 
% zero  12%  12% 
5
th percentile  -1.209  -1.333 
10
th percentile  -0.561  -0.653 
25
th percentile  -0.103  -0.149 
75
th percentile  0.131  0.137 
90
th percentile  0.404  0.393 
95
th percentile  0.727  0.684 
 Panel C: Correlation Coefficients 
 ERROR  ERRVAR  ERRSKEW  lnMVAL  LNANFLL  LOSS  SUE1 
ERRVAR  -0.1654
‡            
ERRSKEW  0.1327
‡ -0.8702
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Notes: 
‡ indicates significance at the 0.001 level. 
Variable definitions for each firm quarter: 
ERROR is actual quarterly earnings taken from I/B/E/S minus the median of all forecasts of quarterly earnings issued within 90 days of 
the earnings announcement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter, expressed as a percentage. 
ERRVAR is the second moment of the price-deflated previous 8 quarters’ forecast errors expressed as a percentage.  
ERRSKEW is the third moment of the price-deflated previous 8 quarters’ forecast errors expressed as a percentage. 
MVAL is the market value of common equity at the beginning of the quarter (in $millions). 
ANFLL is the number of analysts issuing forecasts for each firm in the quarter the forecast falls in. 
LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the consensus forecast of earnings is negative, zero otherwise. 
SUE1 and SUE2 are the price-deflated seasonal unexpected earnings from a random walk at quarters t-1 and t-2 respectively (expressed 
as a percentage). 
In relation to panel C, we compare our sample with that of Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003). Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) use the Zacks 
database from 1985 – 1998; we use I/B/E/S from 1983 – 2003. Both samples are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles.  Forecast 
error is defined (in both cases) as price-deflated quarterly actual earnings minus the forecast multiplied by 100.   
 
 





Price-Deflated Forecast Error Regressions 
Model 1: 
it it it ERRVAR b ERROR ε λ + + = 1 0  
Model 2: 
it it it ERRSKEW ERRVAR b ERROR ε λ λ + + + = 2 1 0  
Model 3: 
it it it ERRSKEW b ERROR ε λ + + = 2 0  
Model 4:  
it it it it it it it it SUE b SUE b LOSS b ANFLL b MVAL b ERRVAR b ERROR ε λ + + + + + + + = 2 1 ln ln 5 4 3 2 1 1 0  
Model 5:  
it it it it it it it it it SUE b SUE b LOSS b ANFLL b MVAL b ERRSKEW ERRVAR b ERROR ε λ λ + + + + + + + + = 2 1 ln ln 5 4 3 2 1 2 1 0  
Model 6:  
it it it it it it it it SUE b SUE b LOSS b ANFLL b MVAL b ERRSKEW b ERROR ε λ + + + + + + + = 2 1 ln ln 5 4 3 2 1 2 0  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 









































































































































































‡ indicates coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests based on White’s corrected standard 
errors. 
t-statistics based on White’s standard errors are in parentheses; OLS t-statistics are in square brackets. 
ERROR is actual quarterly earnings taken from I/B/E/S minus the median of all forecasts of quarterly earnings issued within 90 days 
of the earnings announcement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter, expressed as a percentage. 
ERRVAR is the second moment of the price-deflated previous 8 quarters’ forecast errors expressed as a percentage.  
ERRSKEW is the third moment of the price-deflated previous 8 quarters’ forecast errors expressed as a percentage. 
lnMVAL is the natural log of market value of common equity at the beginning of the quarter (in $millions). 
lnANFLL is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing forecasts for each firm in the quarter the forecast falls in. 
LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the consensus forecast of earnings is negative, zero otherwise. 
SUE1 and SUE2 are the price-deflated seasonal unexpected earnings from a random walk at quarters t-1 and t-2 respectively, 
expressed as a percentage.    
 
Table 3 
Summary statistics for book to market (BM) portfolios and size (S) portfolios  
Panel A: Book-to-
market portfolios 
N  Mean   Median  Std. dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
ERROR        
BM1  (Low)  15,925  -0.0114  0.0169  0.5881 -7.58 120.92 
BM2 15,926  -0.0241  0.0116  0.6470  -5.76  83.90 
BM3 15,925  -0.0733  0.0086  0.8394  -5.16  53.24 
BM4 (High)  15,925  -0.2807  0.0000  1.6633  -3.14  17.26 
ERRVAR        
BM1  (Low)  15,925 3.6730 0.0675  27.3944 11.30  137.65 
BM2  15,926 4.3658 0.1977  28.2281 10.66  125.40 
BM3 15,925  6.3278  0.4989  32.2876  8.78  87.03 
BM4  (High)  15,925 20.3813 1.9693 60.1455  4.39  22.62 
ERRSKEW        
BM1  (Low)  15,925 -16.0945 0.0000 198.1559 -13.48  188.80 
BM2  15,926 -18.4755 0.0000 205.7084 -12.72  169.56 
BM3  15,925 -27.0970 -0.0011  239.3229 -10.46  116.73 
BM4 (High)  15,925  -95.4220  -0.0342  445.6831  -5.38  31.68 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Summary statistics for book to market (BM) portfolios and size (S) portfolios  
Panel B:  Size 
portfolios 
N  Mean   Median  Std. dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
ERROR         
S1 (Small)  19,913  -0.3226  0.000  1.7887  -2.96  15.61 
S2 19,914  -0.0700  0.0174  0.9244  -4.82  46.85 
S3 19,913  -0.0293  0.0178  0.6999  -5.86  74.00 
S4 (Large)  19,913  -0.0077  0.0161  0.5044  -8.06  141.32 
ERRVAR         
S1 (Small)  19,913  21.8062  1.6531  64.9455  4.20  20.49 
S2 19,914  8.7271  0.4726  41.2767  7.11  55.67 
S3 19,913  6.3959  0.2807  33.3614  8.32  77.96 
S4 (Large)  19,913  3.1105  0.0989  23.2653  12.45  172.16 
ERRSKEW         
S1 (Small)  19,913  -103.9603  -0.0312  474.9499  -5.11  28.52 
S2 19,914  -37.0994  -0.0001  290.8626  -8.84  82.25 
S3  19,913  -28.6002 0.0000 252.3109 -10.10  107.77 
S4  (Large)  19,913  -15.9423 0.0000 188.3161 -13.75  198.42 
Notes: 
ERROR is actual quarterly earnings taken from I/B/E/S minus the median of all forecasts of quarterly earnings issued within 90 
days of the earnings announcement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter, expressed as a percentage. 
ERRVAR is the second moment of the price-deflated previous 8 quarters’ forecast errors expressed as a percentage.  
ERRSKEW is the third moment of the price-deflated previous 8 quarters’ forecast errors expressed as a percentage. 
BM represents book-to-market portfolios (where 1 is the lowest B/M quartile and 4 is the highest B/M quartile). 
S represents size portfolios (where S1 comprises the quartile of smallest companies in the full sample and S4 comprises the 
largest). 
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Table 4 
Regressions of models 1-3 by book to market (BM) portfolios and size (S) portfolios 
































































































































              







Table 4 (continued) 
Regressions of models 1-3 by book to market (BM) portfolios and size (S) portfolios 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Panel B:   
Size 
portfolios  S1 
(small) 



























































































































Models are as reported in Table 2. 
S represents size portfolio, where S1 comprises the quartile of smallest companies in the full sample (N = 79,653), while S4 comprises the largest.  
BM represents book to market portfolio, where BM1 comprises the lowest quartile of companies with data available (N = 63,701), while BM4 comprises the highest. 
‡, † indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively; t-statistics based on White’s standard errors are in parentheses. 
Dependent variable (ERROR) is actual quarterly earnings taken from I/B/E/S minus the median of all forecasts of quarterly earnings issued within 90 days of the earnings 
announcement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter, expressed as a percentage. 
ERRVAR is the second moment of the price-deflated previous 8 quarters’ forecast errors, expressed as a percentage.  
ERRSKEW is the third moment of the price-deflated previous 8 quarters’ forecast errors, expressed as a percentage. 
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